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I Introduction
In the recent financial crisis an important dimension along which many governments have taken action
has been fiscal policy. The economics profession and much of the academic discussion placed emphasis
on the issue of whether and to what extent a fiscal stimulus delivers the dual outcome of (i) moderating
the output collapse and (ii) boosting job creation. This assumes great importance also in the light of
the jobless recovery that the US are experiencing in the aftermath of the Great Recession.1
As shown in Figure 1 (left-hand-side quadrant), the cyclical component of private investment posit-
ively co-moves with that of output, exhibiting a considerably greater volatility and leading the cyclical
deviations of the stock of capital, which lies well below trend in the quarters following the Great Re-
cession. The cyclical component of hours worked per employee (right-hand-side quadrant) displays
positive co-movement with the cyclical fluctuations of real output, and the cyclical component of un-
employment is negatively correlated with that of output. However, while hours worked per employee
and output have been on a recovery path since Q2 2009 (the trough of the great recession), the unem-
ployment rate has persistently remained well above average while vacancy posting has remained below
average. During the recovery, overtime hours per employee have also quickly increased, leading the
increase of hours and recently positively deviating from trend more than in the pre-recession period.2
In sum, the recovery of output has been accompanied by a recovery of hours worked, while for the
stock of capital and unemployment it is taking much longer to return to pre-crisis levels.3
In this paper we analyse the effects of a government spending expansion in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with Mortensen-Pissarides labor market frictions, deep habits in
private and public consumption, investment adjustment costs, a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
production function, and adjustments in employment both at the intensive as well as the extensive
1In the literature there is still no consensus on whether the current recovery can be defined as jobless or simply slow, as
we document in the following section.
2Figure 1 also shows the well known fact in the business cycle literature that the unemployment rate is around ten times
more volatile than output. Hours worked per employee are less volatile than output, but the volatility has the same order
of magnitude. Overtime hours, on the contrary, display a much greater volatility. In Table A.1 in the online appendix we
report standard deviations, correlations and autocorrelations of time series in Figure 1.
3The cyclical deviations reported in Figure 1 represent unconditional patterns, which are driven by a potentially large
number of shocks. Therefore, they should not be taken as empirics regarding the effects of fiscal shocks, but rather as
business cycle dynamics that motivate the analysis. In the remainder of the paper we specifically focus on the effects of
fiscal shocks.
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Figure 1: A jobless recovery
Source: ALFRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and authors’ calculations. Percentage deviations from HP-trend for
GDP, private investment, private capital, hours per employee, and overtime hours per employee; percentage deviations from
the sample mean for vacancies and the unemployment rate.
margin.4 This model is consistent with four empirical regularities that have arisen in the literature,
namely that: (a) private consumption and (b) real wage increase following a public spending expansion;
(c) the mark-up is countercyclical and falls following a government spending shock; (d) factor shares are
time-varying at business cycle frequencies and capital and labor are gross complements in production.
The main results are that: (i) we obtain output multipliers in the high range of empirical estimates even
in the absence of nominal rigidities; (ii) we can reproduce a fiscal expansion with low job creation; and
(iii) we can simulate a fiscal stimulus that mitigates the output collapse in a recession but contains the
rise in unemployment only marginally. This scenario is in line with what we observe in the data in the
aftermath of the great recession.
The combination of deep habits and CES technology is crucial for the jobless outcome of a fiscal
stimulus. In fact, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor approaches one, i.e. the
4For alternative approaches on the introduction of labor market frictions see Gali (2011).
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production function approximates a Cobb-Douglas, the presence of deep habits in consumption enables
the model to deliver magnified responses of macroeconomic variables in response to a fiscal stimulus.
As the elasticity of substitution is allowed to drop to values in the range of available estimates – i.e. the
degree of complementarity between capital and labor increases – while the output multiplier falls only
marginally, the unemployment multiplier experiences a sizeable contraction. The unequal effects on the
output and unemployment multipliers depend on the fact that lowering the elasticity of substitution in
the CES production function is equivalent to assuming that the technology is closer to the Leontief case,
i.e. capital and labor are more complements than substitutes. Given that capital is unable to change
instantaneously in response to the fiscal expansion - partly because it is a stock variable and partly
because of the presence of adjustment costs to investment - firms have smaller incentives to create
new jobs through vacancy posting, being this a costly process. However, both the negative wealth
effect (coming from the absorption of resources by the government) and the substitution of leisure with
consumption (coming from the decline in the mark-up due to the presence of deep habits) still act in the
same direction of causing a substantial increase in the supply of hours of work per employee. In such
a case, the expansion in output is driven relatively more by an increase in the hours of work of current
employees rather than new job creation. Thus, the CES technology with an empirically supported
elasticity of substitution proves to be a useful tool to simulate a fiscal stimulus that mitigates the output
collapse in a recession but contains the rise in unemployment only marginally.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II places this paper in the context of
the literature and discusses similarities and differences of our model with previous works. Section III
describes the model. Section IV illustrates the parameter choice. Section V presents the results, isolates
the effects of several features of the model and simulates a scenario compatible with the jobless recovery.
Finally, Section VI concludes and sets the agenda for future research. The paper is complemented by an
online appendix that provides a battery of sensitivity exercises, a sticky prices extension of the model,
the symmetric equilibrium and the steady state of the baseline model.
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II Selected Literature
There is still no broad consensus about the quantitative and qualitative effects of fiscal policy shocks in
the literature. The empirical literature has not provided robust stylized facts yet, hence the theoretical
literature developed a set of models compatible with contrasting results. We briefly report on them5
and then we relate this paper to the jobless recovery literature.
Empirical literature
On the size of fiscal multipliers the literature has provided a variety of results. Auerbach et al. (2010)
describe the range of mainstream estimates of fiscal multipliers as “almost embarrassingly large”.
Recent VAR estimates of the output multiplier are generally greater than those predicted by DSGE
models with no zero-lower-bound constraints but still present values varying from 0.7 to 2.5.6
The literature is divided not only on the quantitative analysis of the fiscal multipliers but also on
the qualitative responses of key macroeconomics variables to fiscal shocks. However, recently Caldara
and Kamps (2008) have shown that these disagreements are mostly due to differences in the sample
selection and in the specification of the reduced-form VAR models. After controlling for different
identification approaches used in the literature, applied to the same reduced-form VAR, they show that
private consumption and the real wage increase after a government spending shock.7 On the size of
the output multiplier, in a more recent paper, Caldara and Kamps (2012) provide further evidence in
favour of the spending multiplier being larger than one. In addition, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and
Canova and Pappa (2011) have recently provided evidence on the fact that the mark-up responds in a
countercyclical way to government spending shocks.
5A full literature review is behind the scope of this paper. For comprehensive reviews of the empirical effects of fiscal
policy please refer to Perotti (2007), Caldara and Kamps (2008) and Hebous (2011).
6Pessimistic estimates of the output multiplier (around 0.7) can be found in (Barro and Redlick, 2011; Ramey, 2009);
some contributions find values around one (see Hall, 2009, among others); while other authors (see Blanchard and Perotti,
2002; Monacelli et al., 2010; Blinder and Zandi, 2010; Acconcia et al., 2011; Fragetta and Melina, 2011, among others)
report values above one. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) study asymmetries in the propagation of fiscal shocks in
booms and downturns and report an output multiplier of up to 2.5 during recessions.
7They also show how the responses of labor market variables seem to be important to rationalize the consumption response.
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Theoretical literature
In models with rational expectations government spending multipliers are typically small. The main
reason is to be found in the negative wealth effect triggered by the increase in government purchases.
This, in fact, crowds out private consumption and investment and makes output respond in a less than
proportional way. Woodford (2011) shows that the government spending multiplier is (i) necessarily
below one in a neoclassical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model and exactly the same both in an RBC
with monopolistic competition and in a sticky-price New-Keynesian (NK) model with strict inflation
targeting; (ii) exactly one in an NK model with fixed real interest rate; (iii) somewhere between the two
values in a model featuring a Taylor rule.8
To analyze the effect of fiscal policy on unemployment, the common practice in the literature has been
that of introducing Mortensen-Pissarides search-matching (MPMF) frictions into otherwise standard
DSGE models (Campolmi et al., 2011; Faia et al., 2010; Monacelli et al., 2010). A typical problem that
arises in models featuring MPMF frictions is their difficulty in matching the unemployment volatility
observed in the data (the so-called “unemployment volatility puzzle”). In the literature, this has mainly
been addressed via the introduction of staggered nominal wages (Gertler and Trigari, 2006; Sala et al.,
2008) although this practice has been criticised by Pissarides (2009). Pissarides (2009) criticises their
introduction as a device to solve the unemployment volatility puzzle on the grounds that while time-
series estimates provide evidence for (average) sticky wages, panel-data estimates support the claim
that wages in the new matches are pro-cyclical. Di Pace and Faccini (2012) tackle the unemployment
volatility puzzle via the introduction of “deep habits” in consumption as in Ravn et al. (2006). The
introduction of deep habits in a DSGE model also imply that a government spending expansion, even
in the presence of flexible prices, reduces the mark-up, fosters the real wage, and crowds in private
consumption.
In the context of our paper, the inclusion of deep-habits into a DSGE model featuring MPMF frictions
in the labor market, in addition to magnifying the amplitude of the responses of unemployment to shocks,
8The results in New-Keynesian (NK) models have also been shown to be dependent on the reaction of monetary policy:
the more accommodative the monetary policy, the higher the fiscal multiplier. On the last point Canova and Pappa (2011)
also provide empirical support using VARs. Moreover, substantially larger-than-one multipliers can be obtained in standard
NK models if the ZLB binds. Christiano et al. (2011) find that the spending multiplier may also reach 10 at the ZLB if the
fiscal stimulus lasts for exactly the quarters during which the ZLB is binding.
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also delivers results in line with three of the four empirical regularities reported in the introduction: (i)
that private consumption is typically crowded in by a government spending expansion as opposed to
being crowded out as a canonical DSGE model predicts; (ii) the real wage increases after a government
spending expansion as opposed to falling as in the canonical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model; (iii)
the mark-up is typically countercyclical.9 The introduction of a CES production function, in the spirit
of Cantore et al. (2010a), completes the picture by matching (iv) the evidence of gross complementarity
between capital and labor in production and time-varying factor shares10 as well as allowing the model
to reproduce a scenario compatible with the jobless recovery.
Jobless recovery
We do not go as far as claiming that ours is the only explanation for the jobless outcome of the fiscal
stimulus during the recovery and indeed the jobless recovery itself is still a very controversial issue in
the literature.11 Possible explanations of the delay in the response of unemployment in recovery periods
(observed from the 1991 recession onwards) have been associated with structural change stories such
as the availability of a more flexible labor force (temporary workers and offshoring), a temporary
increase in the natural rate of unemployment (Daly et al., 2011), the mismatch between job-seekers and
vacancies in the labor market (Sahin et al., 2011), the increase in health benefits and a rise in the speed
of sectoral reallocations (see Groshen and Potter (2003), Andolfatto and MacDonald (2004) and Schreft
et al. (2005) amongst others). However, Aaronson et al. (2004a) and Aaronson et al. (2004b) find little
support for the structural change hypothesis. Some other authors have also given a cyclical explanation
of the jobless recovery. We contribute to this strand of the literature, although we acknowledge that
structural and cyclical explanations of the jobless recovery need not be mutually exclusive. Examples
of business cycle explanations are Aaronson et al. (2004a), relating the jobless recovery to a negative
labor supply shock; Bernanke (2003), focusing on a sluggish aggregate demand; and Bachmann (2011),
calibrating a DSGE model with adjustment costs to the extensive margin. In a recent paper, Shimer
9Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Pappa (2005); Gali et al. (2007); Caldara and Kamps (2008); Pappa (2009); Monacelli
et al. (2010); Fragetta and Melina (2011); Caldara and Kamps (2008).
10Blanchard (1997); Jones (2003, 2005); Klump et al. (2007); Chirinko (2008); McAdam and Willman (2008); Ríos-Rull
and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010); Cantore et al. (2010b, 2012a); León-Ledesma et al. (2012).
11For instance, Galí et al. (2012) go as far as claiming that there are no jobless recoveries but only slow motion recoveries.
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(2012) combines wage rigidities and labor market frictions. His model predicts that employment is
low during a recovery because firms cut back on hiring, not because the incidence of unemployment
rises. He argues that this low hiring accounts for the majority of fluctuations in unemployment and
his approach accounts for the simultaneous increase in unemployment and decline in vacancies that
occurred in the past recession shown in Figure 1. In this paper we link the jobless outcome of a fiscal
stimulus to factor complementarity. This of course does not exclude that other mechanisms (both
cyclical and structural) may reinforce and amplify the jobless recovery mechanism presented here.
III The Model
Search-match technology
The labor market is characterised by standard Mortensen-Pissarides search-match frictions in which
firms fill jobs by posting vacancies. Let nt be the number of employed workers and total population
be normalised to one. Conventionally, we assume that the number of new hires or “matches”, Mt , is a
Cobb-Douglas function of unemployed workers, ut ≡ 1−nt , and vacancies, vt , Mt = κuωt v1−ωt , where
κ represents the efficiency of the matching process and ω ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of the number of
matches to unemployment. Thus, the current probability that a worker finds a match is pt = Mtut =
k
(
ut
vt
)ω−1
= kθ 1−ωt , where θt ≡ vtut is commonly labelled as the labor market “tightness”. The more
vacancies are posted, given a certain level of unemployment, the tighter the labor market is said to be.
Analogously, the current probability that a firm fills a vacancy is given by qt = Mtvt = kθ
−ω
t . Both firms
and workers take pt and qt as given. The two probabilities are linked by p(θt) = θtq(θt) and q′(θt)< 0,
p′(θt)> 0. The law of motion of aggregate employment can be written as
nt+1 = Mt +(1−λ )nt, (1)
where λ is an exogenous job destruction rate.
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Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households indexed by j ∈ [0,1] who have
preferences over a continuum of differentiated consumption varieties indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Household
members can be either employed or unemployed. The employed at firm i∈ [0,1] earn a real wage wit and
suffer disutility from working, while the unemployed receive an unemployment benefit wu. Following
Ravn et al. (2006), we assume that households exhibit external deep habit formation in consumption,
i.e. habits are formed on the average consumption level of each variety of good. Let n jt be the number
of employed household members, and h jt be the hours that each employed individual devotes to work
activities. Then, the total hours of labor supplied by household j is N jt ≡ n jt h jt . Let the total number of
household members be normalised to one, so that n jt can be interpreted as an employment rate. Let also
the total time available to individuals be normalised to one. Then, the leisure time for the employed
members of household j is l jt ≡ 1− h jt , while the unemployed “enjoy” leisure l jt = 1.12 Then, the
representative household’s instantaneous utility function is given by
U((X ct ) j,n
j
t ,1−h
j
t ) = n
j
t U((X ct ) j,1−h
j
t )+(1−n
j
t )U((X ct ) j,1), (2)
where (X ct ) j is a habit-adjusted composite of differentiated consumption goods,
(X ct )
j =
[ˆ 1
0
(C jit −θ
cScit−1)
1− 1η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (3)
parameter η is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across varieties, θ c ∈ (0,1) is the degree of
deep habit formation on each variety, and Scit−1 denotes the stock of external habit in the consumption
of good i. The stock of external habit, Scit , evolves over time according to the law of motion
Scit = ρcScit−1 +(1−ρc)Cit, (4)
12We also assume that workers can perfectly insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. that income is pooled
between the employed and the unemployed.
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where ρc ∈ (0,1) measures the speed of adjustment of the stock of external habit in the consumption
of variety i to changes in the average level of consumption of the same variety.
For household j, the Beveridge curve is given by
n
j
t+1 = (1−λ )n
j
t + p(θt)(1−n
j
t ). (5)
Let us also assume that household j has K jt capital holdings, which evolve according to the law of
motion
K jt+1 = (1−δ )K
j
t + I
j
t
[
1−S
(
I jt
I jt−1
)]
, (6)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate, I jt is investment taking place at time t, and S(·) represents an
investment adjustment cost satisfying S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0. We assume that investment
is also a composite of differentiated goods; however it does not exhibit deep habit formation, i.e.
I jt =
[´ 1
0
(
I jit
)1− 1η di]
1
1− 1η
. Expenditure minimisation leads to the optimal level of demand of investment
goods for each variety i,
I jit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
I jt , (7)
where Pt ≡
[´ 1
0 P
1−η
it di
] 1
1−η is the nominal price index.
Each household j solves a two-stage problem. Letting Pit be the price of variety i, they first minimise
total expenditure
´ 1
0 PitC
j
itdi over C
j
it , subject to (3). This leads to the optimal level of demand for each
variety i for a given composite
C jit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
(X ct )
j +θScit−1, (8)
which is characterised by a price-elastic component and a price-inelastic component.
By multiplying both sides of equation (8) by Pit , integrating across varieties, and using the definition
of nominal price index, we obtain the nominal value of the habit-adjusted consumption composite
Pt(X ct ) j =
´ 1
0 Pit
(
C jit −θScit−1
)
di, which can be rearranged to write the household’s real consumption
expenditure C jt as a function of the consumption composite and the stock of habit: C
j
t = (X ct ) j +Ωt ,
where Ωt ≡ θ c
´ 1
0
Pit
Pt S
c
it−1di.
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The second stage of the problem faced by household j at time t is choosing paths for the habit-
adjusted consumption composite (X ct ) j, capital K jt+1, investment I jt , and government real bond holdings
B jt , which pay the gross real interest rate Rt+1 one period ahead, to maximise lifetime utility
H jt
(
n
j
t ,K
j
t ,B
j
t
)
≡ max
(Xct ) j,K
j
t+1,I
j
t
{
U
(
(X ct ) j,n
j
t ,1−h
j
t
)
+βEtH jt
(
n
j
t+1,K
j
t+1,B
j
t+1
)
}
, (9)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, subject to the law of motion of capital (6) and budget constraint
(
1+ τCt
)(
(X ct )
j +Ωt
)
+ I jt + τt +B
j
t =
(
1− τWt
)
n
j
t h
j
t wit +(1−n
j
t )wu
+
(
1− τKt
)
RKt K
j
t +RtB
j
t−1 +
ˆ 1
0
Jitdi, (10)
where τCt , τWt and τKt are tax rates on consumption, labor income and the return on capital, respectively;
τt is a lump-sum tax; RKt is the rental rate of capital; and
´ 1
0 Jitdi represents firms’ profits.
The first-order condition with respect to the consumption composite (X ct ) j implies that the Lagrange
multiplier on the household’s budget constraint (10) is equal to Λ jt = U
j
x,t
1+τCt
, where U jx,t is the marginal
utility of the consumption composite. Let Λ jt Q jt be the multiplier on the capital accumulation equation
(6), and Q jt represent Tobin’s Q. Then, the first-order condition with respect to capital, K jt+1, yields the
Euler equation
Q jt = Et
{
D jt,t+1
[(
1− τkt+1
)
RKt+1 +(1−δ )Q jt+1
]}
, (11)
where D jt,t+1 ≡ β
U jx,t+1
U jx,t
1+τCt
1+τct+1
is the stochastic discount factor. The first order condition with respect to
investment I jt yields 

Q jt
(
1−S
(
I jt
I jt−1
)
−S′
(
I jt
I jt−1
)
I jt
I jt−1
)
+Et
(
D jt,t+1Q jt+1S′
(
I jt+1
I jt
)(
I jt+1
I jt
)2)


= 1; (12)
while the first order condition with respect to real government bonds implies
1 = Et
[
D jt,t+1Rt+1
]
. (13)
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Employment n jt is determined as a result of a Nash wage bargaining, as described below. The
surplus of the household in the bargaining, Sw jt , can be computed as the value of having an additional
household member employed. By using the envelope condition for employment, we obtain:
(Swt ) j = H
j
nt
(
n
j
t ,K
j
t ,B
j
t
)
=
(
1− τWt
)
wkth jt −
[
wu−
U jn,t
U jx,t
]
+(1−λ − p(θt))Et
[
Dt,t+1(Swt+1) j
]
, (14)
which implies that the surplus from employment for the household is increasing in the net labor income
plus the expected value from being employed the next period and decreasing in the opportunity costs.
Finally, hours of work h jt are chosen in a way that makes the bargain privately efficient, as shown
below.
Government
Deep habits are present also in government consumption. From a technical point of view this is
entirely analogous to how deep habits are introduced in private consumption. From an intuitive point
of view, Ravn et al. (2006) justify this choice by assuming that private households value government
spending in goods in a way that is separable from private consumption and leisure and that households
derive habits on consumption of government-provided goods. Alternatively, as in Ravn et al. (2012)
and Leith et al. (2009), one can also argue that public goods are local in nature and households care
about the provision of individual public goods in their constituency relative to other constituencies. For
example, controversies over “post-code lotteries” in health care and other local services (Cummins et al.,
2007) and comparisons of regional per capita government spending levels (MacKay, 2001) suggest that
households care about their local government spending levels relative to those in other constituencies.
Moreover, Ravn et al. (2012) also propose the idea of procurement relationships that create a tendency
for the government to favour transactions with sellers that supplied public goods in the past.
In each period t, the government allocates spending PtGt over differentiated goods sold by retailers
12
in a monopolistic market to maximise the quantity of a habit-adjusted composite good
Xgt =
[ˆ 1
0
(Git −θ cSgit−1)
1− 1η di
] 1
1− 1η
, (15)
subject to the budget constraint ´ 10 PitGit ≤PtGt , where η is the elasticity of substitution across varieties,
Sgit−1 denotes the stock of habits for government expenditures, which evolves as
Sgit = ρcS
g
it−1 +(1−ρc)Git . (16)
At the optimum:
Git =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
Xgt +θ cSgit−1. (17)
Aggregate real government consumption Gt is set as an exogenous process,
log
(
Gt
¯G
)
= ρG log
(
Gt−1
¯G
)
+ εgt , (18)
where ¯G is the steady-state level of government spending, ρG is an autoregressive parameter and εgt is
a mean zero, i.i.d. random shock with standard deviation σ G.
The government budget constraint will then read as
Bt = RtBt−1 +Gt +(1−nt)wu− τt − τCt Ct − τWt wtntht − τKt Rkt Kt , (19)
while taxes are set according to the following feedback rule:
log
(
Xt
¯X
)
= ρX log
(
Xt−1
¯X
)
+ρXB
Bt−1
Yt−1
+ εXt , Xt = (τ, τc,τw,τk), (20)
where ρX are autoregressive coefficients; ¯X are steady-state values; εXt are serially uncorrelated, nor-
mally distributed shocks with zero mean and standard deviations σ X , and ρXB is the responsiveness of
tax X to the debt-to-GDP ratio.
We set steady-state government debt equal to zero in steady state, implying also that the government
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runs a balanced budget in steady state. To explore our benchmark scenario of lump-sum taxes and fully
financed lump-sum taxation, it suffices to set the tax rates and government debts constantly equal to
zero, Bt = τCt = τWt = τKt = 0, and τt = Gt +(1−nt)wu.
Firms
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0,1] uses capital, Kit , and labor,
Nit ≡ nithit to produce differentiated goods Yit , which are sold at price pit ≡ Pit/Pt . The technology
used in the production process is represented by F((ZK)tKit ,(ZN)tnithit), where (ZK)t and (ZN)t , are
a capital-augmenting technology shock and a labor-augmenting technology shock, respectively.
Employment at firm i evolves over time according to the law of motion
nit+1 = (1−λ )nit +q(θt)vit , (21)
where θt is treated as exogenous by the firm.
In addition, the firm faces hiring costs, HCit , of posting vit vacancies and employing nit workers
given by
HCit = g(zit)nit ; g′,g′′ ≥ 0, (22)
where zit ≡
(
vit
nit
)
is the vacancy ratio.13
The firm rents capital services from households at a rental rate RKt , takes employment nit as given
at time t, and maximises the flow of discounted profits
Jt(nit) = Et


∞
∑
s=0
Dt,t+s

 pit (Cit+s +Git+s + Iit+s)−HCit+s
−wit+snit+shkt+s−RKt+sKit+s



 , (23)
with respect to Kit+s, nit+s, vit+s,Cit+s, Scit+s, Git+s, S
g
it+s and pit+s ≡ Pit+s/Pit+s subject to (21), (22),
the demand for good i in the form of private consumption Cit , (8), government consumption Git , (17),
and investment, (7), the laws of motion of the stocks of habit for households, (4), and the government,
13Note in the original Pissarides model g(zt) = czt so that hiring costs per vacancy posted are constant.
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(16), and the firm’s resource constraint
Cit+s+Git+s + p−ηit It+s = F((ZK)tKit ,(ZN)tnithit) =Yit . (24)
The corresponding first-order conditions for this problem are:
RKt = MCtFK,it , (25)
µit = (MCtFN,it −wit)hit +g′(zit)zit −g(zit)+(1−λ )Et [Dt,t+1µit+1] , (26)
g′ (zit) = q(θt)Et [Dt,t+1µit+1] , (27)
νct ,= pit −MCt +(1−ρc)λ ct , (28)
λ ct = EtDt,t+1(θ cνct+1 +ρcλ ct+1), (29)
νgt = pit −MCt +(1−ρc)λ gt , (30)
λ gt = EtDt,t+1(θ cνgt+1 +ρcλ
g
t+1), (31)
Cit +Git +(1−η)p−ηit It +ηMCt p
−η−1
it It −ηνct p
−η−1
it X
c
t −ην
g
t p
−η−1
it X
g
t = 0. (32)
Variables MCt , µit , νct , λ ct , νgt , λ gt are the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (24), (21),
(8), (4), (17), (16), respectively. In particular, MCt is the shadow value of output and represents the
firm’s real marginal cost.
If we denote the nominal marginal cost with MCnt , the gross mark-up charged by final good firm
i can be defined as Mit ≡ Pit/MCnt = PitPt /
MCnt
Pt = pit/MCt . In the symmetric equilibrium all final good
firms charge the same price, Pit = Pt , hence the relative price is unity, pit = 1. It follows that, in the
symmetric equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal cost.
By combining equations (28), (30) and (32), substituting for the demands for Cit and Git , (8) and
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(17), and rearranging, the optimal pricing decision in the symmetric equilibrium can be written as


(
X ct +X
g
t + It
)[
1− ηη−1MCt
]
+ ηη−1(1−ρc)
[
λ ct X ct +λ gt Xgt
]
− θ
c
η−1
(
Sct−1 +S
g
t−1
)

= 0. (33)
The surplus of the firm from employment at the margin is represented by µit ,
S fit = µit , (34)
while FK,it represents the marginal product of capital, and FN,it represents the marginal product of labor.
Note that (26) uses the fact that the product of an employee is given by Fn,it = FN,ithit at the margin.
Iterating (26) one period forward and combining it with (27) yields the following vacancy equation
or job creation condition:
g′ (zit)
q(θt)
= Et [Dt,t+1µit+1)]
= Et

Dt,t+1

 (MCtFN,it+1−wit+1)hit+1+g′ (zit+1)zit+1
−g(zit+1)+(1−λ )g
′(zit+1)
q(θt+1)



 . (35)
Clearly, in the absence of hiring costs, g(zit+1) = g′(zit+1) = 0, (35) becomes MCtFN,it = wit , the
competitive labor market outcome.
Wage bargaining and hours worked
Let ε ∈ [0,1] denote the firm’s bargaining power and Swit be the surplus of a household negotiating
with firm i. Then, Nash bargaining implies that the real wage maximises the weighted product of the
worker’s and the firm’s surpluses from employment:
max
wit
(Swit )
1−ε
(
S fit
)ε
(36)
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The solution to problem (36) yields the following surplus-splitting rule:
Swit =
1− ε
ε
(1− τwt )S
f
it. (37)
The introduction of the distortionary labor tax makes the workers actual bargaining power fluctuate
along the business cycle and reduces the share of the workers in the bargaining itself. Substituting for
(14), (34), and (26) into (37) and rearranging yields the wage equation,
withit = (1− ε)
[
MCtFN,ithit −g(zit)+g′(zit)zit +θtg′(zit)
]
+ ε

wu− Un,tUx,t
1− τwt

 . (38)
Condition (38) implies that the wage paid to the employee is a weighted average of the marginal product
of the employee plus the savings from job continuation, net of the cost of posting vacancies, and the
opportunity cost of working, which is increasing in the unemployment benefits, the disutility of working
activities and the labor income tax.
Finally, we follow Thomas (2008) in modelling hours per worker as being determined by firms and
workers in a privately efficient way, i.e. in order to maximize the joint surplus of their employment
relationship. The joint surplus is in turn the sum of the firm’s surplus, S fit , and the worker’s surplus, Swit .
By maximizing the joint surplus with respect to hit , we obtain the hours-determination condition
MCtFN,it =−
Unh,it
Ux,it
+ τwt wt , (39)
according to which the marginal revenue product of labor is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure and the labor income tax paid on each hour of work. In the absence
of distortionary taxes, with τwt = 0,∀t (i.e. in the vast majority of experiments conducted in this paper),
hours are independent of the hourly wage.
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Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets clear. The resource constraint completes the model:
Yt =Ct + It +Gt +g(zt)nt. (40)
The system of equations describing the full equilibrium is summarised in the online appendix,
Section D, while the steady state is outlined in Section E.
CES production function and “re-parametrization”
We specialise the production function F((ZK)tKt ,(ZN)tntht) as a constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) production function,
F((ZK)tKt ,(ZN)tntht) =
[
αK ((ZK)tKt)
σ−1
σ +αN((ZN)tntht)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1 (41)
where Kt is capital, nt is the number of employees, ht are hours worked per employee, (ZK)t and
(ZN)t are capital and labor-augmenting technology shocks, σ is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor, and αK and αN are the so-called distribution parameters. Note that, unlike in the
Cobb-Douglas case, the distribution parameters do not represent factor shares of income and are not
dimensionless. In other words, these have dimensions that depend on the measurement units of capital
and labor as discussed in Cantore and Levine (2012). As such, the distribution parameters are mean-
ingless and cannot be calibrated. In this subsection, we show that once the capital share of income has
been calibrated, αK and αN can be “re-parameterized”, i.e. expressed as functions of this share and of
endogenous variables of the model, which in turn depend on the deep parameters. This procedure is
conducted in the spirit of Cantore and Levine (2012).
As σ → 1, the CES production function collapses to a Cobb-Douglas (CD) if and only if αK +αN = 1.
While σ → 0 leads to the Leontief case.
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In the CES case, marginal products of capital and labor take the following forms:
FK,t = αK(ZK)
σ−1
σ
t
(
Yt
Kt
) 1
σ
, (42)
FN,t = αN(ZN)
σ−1
σ
t
(
Yt
ntht
) 1
σ
. (43)
Let variables without time subscript denote steady-state values and SK ≡ FKKY ∈ (0,1) be the cal-
ibrated capital share of income. Combining equation (42) with the definition of capital share and
rearranging yields αK as a function of the capital share and endogenous variables,
αK = SK
(
Y
(ZK) ·K
) σ−1
σ
. (44)
As σ → 1, i.e. the production function tends to a CD, αK → SK . As the total products of capital
and labor have to add up to total output, the following holds:
FNnh
Y
= 1−
FKK
Y
= 1−SK. (45)
Combining equations (43) and (45) allows us to recover αN ,
αN = (1−SK)
(
Y
(ZN)nh
)σ−1
σ
. (46)
As σ →1, αN → (1− SK). Note that if the labor market is not Walrasian, i.e. it is characterised
by wage bargaining and hiring costs, (1− SK) does not represent the labor share, SN , but it also
includes the share of income that is wasted in the search-matching and bargaining process, SSM ≡ g(z)nY ,
where g(z)n represents total hiring costs, which are a function of the vacancy rate z. In equilibrium,
SK +SN +SSM = 1.
19
Additional functional forms
Equation (2) specialises as a non-additively-separable utility function:
U(X ct ,nt ,1−ht) = nt
[
X c(1−ρ)t (1−ht)ρ
]1−σc
−1
1−σc
+(1−nt)
X c(1−ρ)(1−σc)t −1
1−σc
, (47)
where σc > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between
leisure and consumption. When σc → 1, preferences are represented by an additively separable utility
function; while in the case of full employment, i.e. nt → 1, the equation reads as a standard utility
function in consumption and leisure compatible with balanced growth.
Investment adjustment costs take the form of a quadratic function,
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
γ
2
(
It
It−1
−1
)2
, µ > 0, (48)
while the model allows for a possibly convex hiring cost function, i.e. g(zt) specialises as
g(zt) =
χ
1+ψ z
1+ψ
t , ψ ≥ 0. (49)
IV Parameter Choice
We assign numerical values to parameters in order to match either a number of stylised facts for the US
economy in the post-WWII era or according to available empirical estimates or conventions. The time
period in our model corresponds to one quarter in the data. Table 1 summarises the parameter choice.
A set of parameters are simply set equal to values that are widely used in the literature. Namely, we
set the subjective discount factor, β , equal to 0.99, which implies a quarterly real interest rate of about
1%. The capital depreciation rate, δ , and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σc, are set equal to
0.025 and 2, respectively, while the capital share of income, SK , takes the conventional value of 1/3.
The elasticity of substitution across varieties, is set to a rather standard value of 6, which implies a
steady-state mark-up of around 20% in the absence of deep habits.
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Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital share of income SK 1/3
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Relative risk aversion σc 2
Elasticity of substitution in production function σ 0.4
Elasticity of substitution across varieties η 6
Investment adjustment cost parameter γ 3.24
Degree of deep habit formation θ c 0.86
Habit persistence ρc 0.85
Job separation rate λ 0.103
Elasticity of matching to unemployment ω 0.5
Firms’ bargaining power ε 0.5
Share of government spending in output g¯/y¯ 0.2
Persistence of government spending shock ρg 0.90
Persistence of tax shocks ρX 0.90
Convexity in hiring cost ψ 0
Elasticity of subst leisure/consumption ρ set to target ¯h = 0.33
Scaling factor in hiring cost function χ set to target p¯ = 0.95
Scaling factor in matching function κ set to target q¯ = 0.70
Unemployment benefit wu set to target ¯Θ = 0.70
Table 1: Baseline calibration
When the production function takes the general CES form, we set the elasticity of substitution, σ ,
equal to 0.40, a value close to the empirical estimates in León-Ledesma et al. (2012). We obtain the
Cobb-Douglas as a limiting case, by setting σ → 1. The investment adjustment cost parameter is set
equal to 3.24, the value estimated by Christiano et al. (2005). The degree of deep habit formation, θ c,
and the habit persistence, ρc, are set equal to 0.86 and 0.85, respectively. These are the same estimated
values used in Ravn et al. (2006). We then set the convexity parameter, ψ , in the hiring cost function to
0, which makes it linear as the assumption of convex hiring costs made by Gertler and Trigari (2006) and
Thomas (2008) is not needed in the absence of the Calvo wage setting. The firms’ bargaining power, ε ,
and the elasticity of matching to unemployment, ω , are both set equal to 0.5. This choice satisfies the
Hosios condition for the efficiency of the equilibrium. There is no reason to believe that this condition
holds in practice, however this parameter choice is shared by most of the existing literature and hence
allows comparability of the results. The value for the job separation rate, λ , is set equal to 0.103 to
imply that jobs last on average 2 years and a half. This is in line with the calculations made by Shimer
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(2005). The persistence of fiscal shocks is set equal to 0.90, which is approximately the value observed
in the data (see Monacelli et al., 2010, among others).
Finally, we set (i) the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption, ρ; (ii) the scaling
factor in the hiring cost function, χ; (iii) the scaling factor in the matching function, κ , and (iv) the
unemployment benefit, wu, in order to match: (a) a steady-state share of hours worked over total hours,
¯h, of 33%; (b) a steady-state job finding probability, p¯, equal to 95% as in Gertler et al. (2008); (c) a
value for the vacancy filling probability, q¯, equal to 70%, as in Trigari (2009); and (d) a ratio for the
value of non-work to work activities (replacement ratio), ¯Θ≡ wu− ¯Un/ ¯UcFn (i.e. the sum of unemployment
benefits and the disutility of work over the marginal product of employment), equal to 70%, a value
very close to the point estimate of 72% by Sala et al. (2008). As the value for the replacement ratio
is debated in the literature and is an important determinant of the unemployment multiplier, we show
sensitivity of our results to different magnitudes for this parameter in the online appendix, Section B.2.
In addition to the explicitly-targeted steady-state values, this calibration implies reasonable “great
ratios”; namely a consumption/output ratio of 61%, an investment/output ratio of 18% and a hiring
costs/output ratio of 1%. The choice of the job separation rate, coupled with the job finding probability
implies, through the Beveridge curve, a steady-state unemployment rate of approximately 9.5%, a value
close to that of Hall (2005).
V Results
We present the results starting from a standard neoclassical (RBC) model with search and matching
frictions in the labor market and adding deep habits and the CES technology one at a time. First, we
present the well known results that in the baseline RBC model the output multiplier is well below the
range of available empirical estimates. We also show some features at odds with the data, namely
constant price mark-up and factor shares, a negative response of the real wage and a negative response
of consumption following a government spending shock. Second, we show how, even in the absence
of price stickiness, the introduction of deep habits magnifies the responses of macroeconomic variables
to a fiscal stimulus. At the same time, in line with Ravn et al. (2006), the mark-up falls, real wages
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rise and consumption is crowded in after an expenditure expansion. Furthermore, by introducing the
CES production function, we show that, as capital and labor became more complementary, the growth
of output fostered by a government spending expansion is sustained relatively more by an increase in
the intensive margin (current employees work longer hours) than an increase in the extensive margin
(new job creation). Factor shares now present cyclical fluctuations. Last, we explore the effects of a
fiscal stimulus at a recession time, which fosters a jobless recovery. In the online appendix we show
that an accommodative monetary policy with respect to the output gap alongside sticky prices plays an
important role for the stabilisation properties of the fiscal stimulus.
Neoclassical benchmark with search-match frictions
In Figure 2 we plot the impulse responses of a number of fundamental macroeconomic variables to
a government spending expansion of size 1% of output. Normalising the size of the fiscal shock as
such allows us to interpret the output responses as fiscal multipliers. For unemployment, we report the
absolute changes in percentage points that the increase in spending by 1% of output triggers.
This can be regarded as a measure of the unemployment multiplier. This exercise is conducted under
the assumption that the fiscal measure is fully financed by lump-sum taxes.
As a benchmark, we consider the effects of a government spending expansion in a model where
the production function is Cobb-Douglas, and no deep habits in private and government consumption
are formed. The results are in line with most of the recent theoretical fiscal stimulus literature: a fiscal
expansion triggers a negative wealth effect, via an increase in tax obligations, that curbs consumption
and boosts labor supply. In the context of MPMF, this has a negative effect on households’ reservation
wage and a smaller positive effect on firms’ reservation wage. This translates into more vacancies being
posted, a tighter labor market, a reduction in equilibrium unemployment, and a fall in the real wage.
The absorption of resources by the government is such that private investment is also crowded out and
the real interest rate rises. As standard in flexible-price neoclassical models with imperfect competition,
the price mark-up over the marginal cost remains constant. Another standard result – coming instead
from the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function – is that capital and labor shares of income are
also constant.
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Figure 2: A government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget) in an
RBC model augmented with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Frictions: the effects of deep habits in
consumption.
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From a quantitative point of view, results are similar to existing contributions such as Campolmi et al.
(2011) and Monacelli et al. (2010): government spending expansions yield output multipliers well below
one (slightly above 0.5 for our calibration) and almost negligible negative effects on unemployment.
These results contrast with much of the recent empirical literature, both from a quantitative and from
a qualitative point of view. On the quantitative side, recent empirical estimates of the output multiplier
are generally greater than those predicted by DSGE models with no zero-lower-bound constraints. On
the qualitative side, there is also empirical evidence that government spending expansions crowd in
private consumption and boost both hours worked and the real wage (see Pappa, 2005; Gali et al., 2007;
Pappa, 2009; Fragetta and Melina, 2011, among others). In addition, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and
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Canova and Pappa (2011) find evidence for a fall in the price mark-up following a fiscal expansion.
Deep habits
As shown in Figure 2, the introduction of deep habits in consumption yields a substantial improvement
on the performance of the DSGE model in matching these empirical findings.14
The differences in the transmission mechanism of a fiscal shock in a model with deep habits in
consumption work through the fact that the mark-up is counter-cyclical under deep habits even if the
model features fully flexible prices. Under deep habits the mark-up is counter-cyclical due to the
coexistence of two effects: an intra-temporal effect (or price-elasticity effect) and an inter-temporal
effect. The intra-temporal effect can easily be understood by looking at the demand faced by an
individual firm i:
ADit =Cit +Git + Iit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η (
X ct +X
g
t + It
)
+θ c
(
Scit−1 +S
g
it−1
)
, (50)
where Git is public consumption of variety i, Iit is the component entering the investment aggregator
It (which is not subject to deep habits) and Xgt and Sgit are the public counterparts of the habit-adjusted
consumption composite and the stock of habit for variety i. The right-hand side of the demand curve is
given by the sum of a price-elastic term and a price-inelastic term. When the habit-adjusted aggregate
demand
(
X ct +X
g
t + It
)
rises, the “weight” of the price-elastic component of demand grows and the
effective price elasticity of demand, η˜it ≡−∂ADit∂ pit
pit
ADit = η
(
1−θ c (S
c
it−1+S
g
it−1)
ADit
)
, increases, as opposed
to remaining constant and equal to η as in the standard case (θ c = 0). The fact that the elasticity
of demand is pro-cyclical is one determinant for the price mark-up being counter-cyclical. The other
determinant comes from the inter-temporal effect: the awareness of higher future sales coupled with the
notion that consumers form habit at the variety level, makes firms inclined to give up some of the current
profits – by temporarily lowering their mark-up – in order to lock-in new consumers into customer/firm
14In the seminal work by Ravn et al. (2006), they already illustrate that a government spending expansion yields a crowding-
in of private consumption as opposed to a crowding-out, when deep habits in private and public consumption are introduced
into an otherwise standard flexible-price model with imperfect competition. In addition, Di Pace and Faccini (2012) find
that deep habits in consumption have the property of considerably magnifying unemployment volatility also in a model with
flexible wages, proposing a solution to Pissarides (2009)’s unemployment puzzle.
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relationships and charge them higher mark-ups in the future.
A government spending expansion,also under deep habits, causes a negative wealth effect. However,
the drop in the mark-up, which in turn implies higher future sales, translates into more vacancy posting
through the job creation condition. The higher labor market tightness implies a relatively greater fall
in the unemployment rate. This coexists not only with an increase in the intensive margin (hours
worked) but also with an increase in the real wage, which is made possible by the greater increase in
the firm’s reservation wage, which induces a rise in the bargained wage. The increase in equilibrium
wage makes leisure relatively more expensive and causes a substitution effect towards consumption that
more than compensate the negative wealth effect. As a result, consumption rises. With a Cobb-Douglas
production function and our baseline calibration the resulting output multiplier is almost 2, while the
peak unemployment multiplier is almost -0.6 percentage points.
In the NK literature the fall in the mark-up and the increase in the real wage are matched to a
certain extent by including price and/or wage stickiness. However, NK models manage to get only
an initial positive response in the real wage – while the empirical literature finds a persistent positive
increase – and the fall in the mark-up is not generally enough to push aggregate supply upward to
such an extent that the fiscal multiplier is dramatically magnified. Consumption is still crowded out
unless either (i) a non-additively separable utility function is adopted and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption is set to be low (i.e. σc, its inverse, is high) entailing strong intratemporal
substitution effects between consumption and leisure (see for example Linnemann, 2006; Monacelli
et al., 2010) or (ii) it has to be assumed that an implausibly high share of consumers show a “rule-of-
thumb” non-optimising behaviour (Gali et al., 2007). Although the zero-lower-bound for the nominal
interest rate has been found to be a determinant for higher output multipliers, we see this more as a
special circumstance rather than a feature able to explain business cycle patterns in general.
CES production function
The empirical literature has not reached a consensus on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy.
Nonetheless, if one wants to operate a synthesis of available empirical estimates on output and unem-
ployment expenditure multipliers, it seems fair to conclude that, when the government purchases more
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of the results to different values of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor, σ .
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget). Model: RBC with
Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), deep habits in consumption (θ c = 0.86 and ρc = 0.85).
goods and services from the private sector, this may yield a sizeable increase in real output, while the
effect on new job creation is likely to be small.15
In this subsection we show that if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor,σ , is allowed
to drop from 1 (CD case) to values in the range of estimated values, the unemployment multiplier drops
considerably more than the output multiplier. Estimates of σ are between 0.3 and 0.6 (Klump et al.,
2007; Chirinko, 2008; Cantore et al., 2012a, 2010b; León-Ledesma et al., 2012).
In Figure 2 we show that a value of σ = 0.4 makes the output multiplier diminish to almost 1.6
(that is 81% of the value obtained in the CD case), while the unemployment multiplier drops to -0.35
percentage points (about 66% of the value obtained in the CD case). In addition, factor shares react to
the government spending expansion.
The unequal effects on the output and unemployment multipliers depend on the fact that lowering the
elasticity of substitution in the CES production function is equivalent to assuming that the technology is
closer to the Leontief case, i.e. capital and labor are gross complements. In Figure 3 we show that, with
a smaller σ , given that capital is unable to change instantaneously in response to the fiscal expansion,
15For OECD countries Holden and Sparrman (2012) find a multiplier of -0.30 percentage points while Brückner and Pappa
(2012) show that the effect may even be negative.
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Figure 4: Peak elasticity of the unemployment rate to real output changes in response to a government
spending expansion at different levels of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.
Note: Fiscal policy: government spending expansion (1% of output, lump-sum taxes, balanced budget). Model: RBC with
Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF), deep habits in consumption (θ c = 0.86 and ρc = 0.85).
firms have smaller incentives to create new jobs through vacancy posting. However, both the negative
wealth effect (coming from the absorption of resources by the government) and the substitution of
leisure with consumption (coming from the decline in the mark-up due to the presence of deep habits)
still act in the same direction of causing a substantial increase in the supply of hours of work. From a
quantitative perspective, this effect is stronger in the presence of investment adjustment costs, as shown
in the online appendix, Section B.4.16
In Figure 4 we plot the peak elasticity of the unemployment rate to output in response to a government
spending expansion at different levels of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. When
σ drops from 1 (CD case) to the lower bound of the range of empirical estimates (σ = 0.3), the peak
elasticity of the unemployment rate to output drops by around 15%.
In sum, if the technology operating in the economy is represented by a CES production function, as
σ falls, the growth of output fostered by a government spending expansion is sustained relatively more
by an increase in the intensive margin (current employees work longer hours) than an increase in the
extensive margin (new job creation).17
16Another additional possible venue in modelling capital is the introduction of variable capital utilization. Such a feature
may be used as a device to soften the jobless outcome of a fiscal stimulus. In fact if firms have an adequate capital buffer,
they may use it in response to a fiscal stimulus. This, together with some complementarity between capital and labor may
yield to higher vacancy posting and hence higher unemployment multipliers.
17In the online appendix, Section B.1, we also show that, as the technology tends to Leontief, the calibration of the
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Figure 5: A fiscal stimulus in a recession.
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Note: Model: RBC with Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Friction (MPMF) and deep habits in consumption (θ c = 0.86 and
ρc = 0.85). Recession driven by a negative technology shock that leads to a peak output contraction of around 7.5% from
steady state with a CES production function. Fiscal stimulus: government spending expansion of 5% of output; lump-sum
taxes; balanced budget. First row (CD): simulated output and unemployment responses in the absence and with the fiscal
stimulus under a Cobb-Douglas technology (σ → 1). Second row (CES): responses under a CES technology (σ = 0.40).
Third row (CD and CES): ratios of impulse responses with and without the fiscal stimulus under CD and CES technologies.
Jobless recovery
In this subsection we investigate the low-job-creation feature of the fiscal stimulus in a case in which
the latter takes place at a recession time.
For illustrative purposes, we simulate a recession by means of a negative technology shock. Figure
5 shows the responses of output and unemployment in the cases in which the production function
is a CD and a CES with σ = 0.4 (bold lines in the first and second row of Figure 5, respectively).
The size of the shock is chosen in order to make output contract by around 7.5% from steady state
at peak when the production function is a CES. This is approximately the size of the deviation of the
bargaining parameter becomes increasingly less important for the equilibrium outcome. Rowthorn (1999) also emphasises
the role of CES technology with an elasticity σ below unity in explaining European unemployment persistence despite
moves towards greater labor market flexibility as captured by an increase in the firm’s bargaining power in our model.
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US output from potential in the second quarter of 2009 (the trough of the great recession according to
the National Bureau of Economic Research), using the series available in ALFRED (Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis). The same shock makes output contract less (6%) when the production function
is CD. In addition the model predicts that unemployment increases at peak by more than 4 percentage
points in the CES case and by 2.5 percentage points in the CD case. In the same charts, we show the
mitigatory effects of a fiscal stimulus (dashed lines). In particular, we proxy the fiscal stimulus with a
government spending expansion of 5% of output, approximately the expenditure expansion foreseen by
the ARRA.18 It is evident that while the fiscal stimulus has similar effects in terms of output stabilisation,
unemployment stabilisation is considerably less pronounced under the CES production function. The
third row of Figure 5 plots the ratios of the impulse responses with the fiscal stimulus activated with
respect to the impulse responses with no fiscal stimulus, in the two alternative cases of CD and CES.
In the experiment proposed here, the output contraction in the presence of the fiscal stimulus is around
50% of the contraction in the no-fiscal policy scenario under CD and around 30% under CES. The rise
in unemployment in the presence of the fiscal stimulus is instead 50% less pronounced under CD and
around 20% under CES. In other words, at a recession time, the model with a CES production function
predicts that a government spending expansion fosters a considerably more jobless recovery.
VI Concluding Remarks
We have analysed the effects of a government spending expansion in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with Mortensen-Pissarides labor market frictions, deep habits in private
and public consumption, capital adjustment costs, a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production
function, and adjustments in employment both at the intensive as well as the extensive margin.
The combination of deep habits and CES technology is crucial. The presence of deep habits mag-
nifies the responses of macroeconomic variables to a fiscal stimulus, while an elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor in the range of available estimates allows the model to produce a scenario
18Blinder and Zandi (2010, table 10) report that the total more-than $ 1-trillion 2009 stimulus package in the US was split
into a total of $ 682 billion for spending increases and $ 383 billion for tax cuts. Given that the 2009 US GDP at current
prices was $ 14 trillion, the spending increases were 4.9% of GDP.
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compatible with the jobless recovery. In other words, factor complementarity proves to be a determinant
of the jobless outcome of a fiscal stimulus. In fact, setting the elasticity of substitution in the CES pro-
duction function equal to a value smaller than one – as found in the empirical literature – is equivalent
to assuming that the technology is closer to a Leontief specification in which capital and labor are gross
complements. Given that capital is unable to change instantaneously in response to the fiscal expansion,
firms have smaller incentives to create new jobs through vacancy posting. However, the trasmission
mechanism of the fiscal shock is characterized by a negative wealth effect and a substitution of leisure
with consumption, both acting in the same direction of a substantial increase in the supply of the hours
of work. Therefore, the expansion in output is driven relatively more by the intensive margin rather
than by the extensive one.
From a policy perspective, this result implies that, for a fiscal stimulus to have a stronger impact
on reducing the rate of unemployment, it should prioritize measures enhancing the economy’s stock
of capital, such as incentives for private investments but also direct government investment in public
infrastructure.
The results presented in this paper are also an important starting point for future research. More
specifically, the model is well-suited for the design of optimal fiscal and monetary rules. In particular,
given the sensitivity of the results to the monetary response, as shown by Cantore et al. (2012b),
examining optimised Taylor rules as e.g. in Levine et al. (2008) would be a useful exercise.
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